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QUESTIONS CONCERNING SCIENCE, THEOLOGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
Louis Caruana SJ 
 
 The interaction between science and theology is usually taken to involve their 
claims. In this paper, I investigate how the interaction may involve their questions. 
Questions concerning the environment will be considered as the focal point because 
we are living at a time when their importance is increasing and this increase will 
probably continue until these questions obtain the attention they deserve. The first 
step in the argument will be to apply a recent aspect of philosophy of science to the 
current discussion about the environment. I will examine how the environment issue 
may be considered a real or an unreal question for scientists. The second step will be 
to explore the global situation what would occur if the community of scientists, and 
other communities, were to function and interact solely in accordance with principles 
of egoism. A final step will show that the distinction between real and unreal 
questions occurs also in theology, and that a certain interaction between real questions 
in science with real questions in theology may occur precisely as regards the 
environment. 
 
 I will introduce the first step by recalling how the philosophy of science has 
passed through different phases. Before about 1960, it was mainly dominated by the 
work of Rudolf Carnap (1928) and Karl Popper (1959). The former held that the 
theory of meaning and the theory of language matter very much in our search for a 
correct understanding of science. He also held that verification should be employed to 
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distinguish between science and non-science. Popper on the contrary did not think 
much of theory of language, and he urged falsification to distinguish between science 
and non-science. Although different, these two positions were similar in so far as they 
both assumed a universal, time-independent method of science in which observation 
is sharply distinguishable from theory. All this was called into question by Thomas 
Kuhn’s work on the historical nature of the sciences which produced a view according 
to which observation and theory are mutually dependent (Kuhn 1969). Here a 
revolutionary change is not a rational change, and science cannot be said to be 
cumulative. The debate however drifted away then from arguments about the nature 
of rationality. It shifted to discussions about the status of theoretical entities, the main 
question being whether, say, electrons or quarks really exist or whether they are just a 
very convenient conceptual tool to find our way around in what we observe.  
 
 This way of engaging in the debate still has many protagonists today, but 
some recent work has opened up the possibility of resetting the entire issue on new 
ground (Jardine 1991). Instead of discussing the reality of entities, one may discuss 
the reality of questions for the scientific community. A range of questions are real in a 
given community at a given time when they are questions which the members of the 
community can see how they can get to grips with. Understanding questions real in 
my community implies that I appreciate what the community considers relevant to 
those questions. Understanding questions unreal in my community but real in another 
community involves appreciation of the considerations that would be taken in that 
other community to be relevant to that question. In another philosophical context, 
much has been said about live metaphors and dead metaphors. A similar distinction 
can be drawn in the field of questions constituting human inquiry. For any given 
community of inquirers we may have questions which used to be real but lost their 
relevance through the ages. Such questions, having been replaced by others, are now 
considered dead: they are usually taken to be totally misplaced, or the embarrassing 
sign of our previous ignorance. 
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 Some brief examples may make this distinction clearer. Medieval natural 
philosophy held that the heavenly bodies, being immaterial and devoid of terrestrial 
qualities, are entirely different from terrestrial bodies. A basic explanatory 
presupposition of this type of natural philosophy was the Aristotelian claim that 
rotation is the motion natural to a sphere. Questions formulated within this framework 
therefore preclude many applications of reasons derived from terrestrial physics to the 
resolutions of questions about the heavens. For Newtonian natural philosophy, 
another presupposition was considered fundamental, namely the claim that a body 
will continue in a state of rest or of uniform motion if acted on by no forces. The 
separation between heavenly bodies and terrestrial bodies lost its explanatory 
influence. The doors were opened therefore for questions concerning the relationship 
between what is observed here on earth and what is observed in the heavens. Another 
example that has been extensively studied is the shift from eighteenth-century natural 
history to nineteenth-century biology. This is seen as another manifestation of a shift 
in type of inquiry, a shift from the ordering of things on the basis of their external and 
visible characteristics, to a modern inquiry concerning origins, historical formations, 
hidden structures and inner processes (Foucault 1970). 
 
 What social forces or motivations are acting on a community of inquirers 
when such a shift of questioning occurs? To answer this question, case studies are 
indispensable. I will briefly consider only one example here, an example not from a 
distant historical period, a choice which would usually render the details inaccessible 
to a certain extent, but one from recent events. In the US, in the first week of October, 
1993, The Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) was effectively killed. It had been 
planned to be a proton collider that could open up a qualitatively new domain of 
physics and ensure the US of its lead in high-energy physics with respect to the 
European centres such as the large electron-positron collider (LEP) at CERN in 
Geneva. What was it that blocked this huge enterprise? Problems of poor management 
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were certainly present. But the main reason apparently was the ever-increasing costs 
which were drawing from resources desperately needed for the economy (Ritson 
1993). Interesting insights into what arguments were used to prove that the SSC 
should have been considered essential to tackle questions which were then considered 
real can be obtained from a paper presented by C. Quigg at a Workshop in 1986. It 
seems that the three main real questions according to Quigg were the following:  (1) 
the SSC was conceived to take the step needed for a ‘thorough exploration of the 1 
TeV scale’; (2) the SSC ‘will clarify the structure and symmetry of the fundamental 
interaction and allow us to extrapolate with greater confidence back to early times’, 
i.e. it will simulate the conditions that prevailed about 10-15 second after the Big Bang; 
(3) ‘with the support of our government, hard work, and a little bit of luck, we may 
have, by 1995, a new instrument to explore the 1 TeV scale, and to bring us closer to 
the dream of an enduring understanding of all natural phenomena’ (Quigg 1987). In 
spite of these prospects, the project was abandoned. This move could be understood 
simply as a confirmation of the Peircean insight that new discoveries in science are 
bound to become, as time goes on, more expensive and less important.1 But it could 
legitimately be studied at many other levels as well. In this way one approaches as 
much as possible a full appreciation of all the scientific, sociological, ethical and 
political principles at work.2  
 
 But from the little I have said so far, it seems reasonable to draw the 
conclusion that, when a shift of inquiry is in progress, a clash of interests goes hand in 
hand with a choice, often implicit, of types of questions we concern ourselves with. I 
am not suggesting here that, to ensure genuine scientific progress, a member of a 
given research community must possess a complete and explicit understanding of the 
                                                 
1  The allusion is to Peirce’s thought-provoking essay, ‘The Economy of Research’, where he holds 
that: ‘when an investigation is commenced, after the initial expenses are once paid, at little cost we 
improve our knowledge, and improvement then is especially valuable; but as the investigation goes on, 
additions to our knowledge cost more and more, and at the same time, are less and less worth’ (Peirce 
1958, 7: 144). 
2  Some accounts of the entire issue, like Weinberg 1993, are unfortunately surprisingly narrow-
minded and ‘populist’. 
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criteria of relevance at work in the community. Such a complete grasp will effectively 
block the possibility of surprise discoveries, and examples of surprise discoveries 
abound in history.3 All I am suggesting is that a clash of interests means a clash of 
criteria for relevance. Some groups will start considering some new questions as real 
while other groups will remain content with the previous set of questions. 
 
 It is my contention in this paper that the global, environmental consciousness 
which has emerged within the last few decades can be understood in terms of this type 
of analysis. A new question is imposing itself on humanity. A new question is 
becoming real.  
 
 For greater clarity, what I am calling the environment question should be 
distinguished from a problem in ecology. A problem in ecology is a purely scientific 
problem arising from the fact that scientists do not understand some particular 
phenomenon, like for example how DDT finds its way into the fat of Antarctic birds. 
The environment question, on the contrary, is here being presented as a special sort of 
social problem. It covers more ground than the purely scientific issues. It includes the 
economic, moral and philosophical dimensions of the question as it is experienced 
and expressed by society. The four main subdivisions of this question may be taken to 
concern pollution, conservation, preservation, and multiplication (Passmore 1974). 
From this perspective, the environment question may be expressed in terms of the 
following sub-questions: (1) How are we to solve the political difficulties in 
legislating against pollution when such legislation is usually a restriction of very 
powerful interests by local communities? (2) How are we to be sure that future 
generations will need what we are conserving and that they will not need what we are 
rejecting? How are individuals to be encouraged to sacrifice themselves for future 
                                                 
3  A striking one is the link between diabetes and pancreatic disorders. This discovery come about 
through the work of O. Minkowski (1858-1931) and J. von Mering (1849-1908) who removed the 
pancreas from a dog in order to see whether the organ was essential to life. Such an operation was 
considered at the time completely irrelevant to the understanding of diabetes. 
  6 
generations, given this uncertainty? (3) What should determine whether a particular 
area of the earth’s surface should be used commercially for the benefit of many or 
preserved in its present state which does not yet bear the marks of human handiwork? 
(4) To what extent should the present generation surrender the freedom of individuals, 
or abandon respect for persons, in the name of control over population growth? 
 
 Given this starting point about the nature of the environment issue, I will now 
move to the second step of my argument. If we take this complex environment issue 
as a question which is invading, as it were, the interests of the scientific community, a 
question which is becoming real for that community, then it is important to examine 
what forces are at work in this particular process of realisation. It may be argued that 
what is behind such a process is the exercise of a certain kind of universal goodwill 
inherent in human beings. According to this view, the scientific community is 
becoming aware that people are suffering, and such an awareness is in the process of 
pushing those members responsible for the administration of that community to 
exercise their altruism and start directing research in a direction that will benefit the 
multitudes. In my opinion, such a process may in fact be happening, and we have no 
reason to believe that genuine altruism plays no part in the shifts of interests we are 
examining. However, one can hardly believe that this explains the entire process. 
What goodwill means is often considered culturally and geographically local. On a 
planetary scale, we are still living in a system of coexisting communities dominated, 
to a certain extent, by the principle of survival of the richest. It is true that 
homogeneous, and perhaps even universal, ethical visions are being formulated so as 
to be binding to all communities, but this should not make us underestimate the role 
the principle of egoism plays in international affairs. What I want to examine now is 
the worst case — the case when the different communities on the planet are not 
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motivated by altruism but solely by egoism.4 What will make a question real for the 
scientific community in that case? 
 
 In such a context, the reality of questions may perhaps be best understood as 
depending on Darwinian principle of survival of the fittest, understood here in a 
specific sense. Survival of real questions for the scientific community depends on 
what cash value they are producing to that community. New questions become real 
when the community is constrained to accept the relevance of those questions as a 
matter of gaining more power, as a matter of raising the members’ standard of living, 
understood in a specific sense, and, a fortiori, as a matter of survival in the literal 
sense. For example, the questions which were meant to be examined through the 
Superconducting Super Collider have lost their battle for importance against other 
questions which the US administration deemed more important. Questions concerning 
particle-physics may still be considered relevant by some members of the scientific 
community, but a sustained inability to tackle them will inevitably end up in their 
losing their reality for that community. If this analysis of the mechanism behind the 
reality of questions is accepted, then we may ask: as regards the environment 
question, what is the struggle that has to be engaged in, or is already being engaged 
in, until this particular question becomes real? 
 
 For this particular case, the element of survival is trivially obvious. The 
environment question becomes real by its very nature, because it concerns the 
survival of life on the planet.5 It will inevitably become real, therefore, when the 
relevance to our well-being of pollution, conservation, preservation, and 
                                                 
4  This distinction is sometimes expressed by describing how one person may play different roles in 
society: sometimes as a ‘citizen’, concerned with public interest and sometimes as a ‘consumer’, 
concerned with personal, or self-regarding, wants and interests. Mark Sagoff (1988, 7-8) argues that 
social regulation should reflect the community-regarding values that we express through political 
processes, and not simply, or primarily, our self-regarding preferences.  
5  Neil Everndon makes a similar prognosis. He argues that we will inevitably become more and more 
aware that there is no sharp distinction between us, as human inquirers, and the natural world we 
scrutinise (Evernden 1992). 
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multiplication will outrun the importance of other questions which dominate the 
scientific community at present. To obtain a deeper understanding of what is at stake 
in this kind of shift of interests we should take into consideration the way the global 
human population is made up of different communities: some rich, others poor; some 
having one set of real questions, and others having other sets of real questions. It is a 
fact that the scientific community is, perhaps necessarily, a rich community — the 
one which is therefore in the best position to protect itself from the harmful effects of 
the four dimensional, environment issue mentioned above. Other communities will be 
more vulnerable to the threat to survival than the scientific community. 
 
 This state of affairs entails the following conclusion. What will push the 
members of the scientific community into considering the environment issue as a real 
question are threats to survival which are, from their point of view, only the tip of the 
iceberg. Other more vulnerable communities will have had a much higher share of 
suffering before the scientific community becomes convinced that the entire issue 
deserves to be considered a real question. 
 
 The approach involving the idea of real or unreal questions, which has 
resulted in this alarming conclusion, finds an echo in some recent theological works. 
To examine in great detail on what grounds a question may become real in a 
theological context is outside the scope of this paper, even though it is of crucial 
importance. However, to arrive at some conclusions regarding one possible 
interaction between science and theology, it will be useful to mention briefly three 
examples of theologians who expressed some aspects of their work in terms which 
approach this idea of the emergence of real questions. 
 
 Edward Schillebeeckx has produced, among other works, the precious little 
books on the Eucharist, on clerical celibacy, and on ministry. It is arguable that the 
views expressed in these books arose from his reflections on the observation that 
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people’s experiences seemed, at that time, to be contradicting church teaching and 
discipline. Concrete experiences in his own surroundings made him concentrate his 
attention on some questions rather than on others. His commitment to the concretness 
of history, therefore, may be said to have been an important criterion for him. In the 
vocabulary employed in this paper, one may understand Schillebeeckx as working on 
the assumption that some criterion defines the reality of questions in theology: real 
questions for him would be those arising from concrete experience. He was well 
aware however that the process of a theological question’s becoming real is a 
complex one. Experience cannot push us towards a new theological question without 
us having recourse to previous theological understanding of that same experience: ‘In 
faith and theology, the situation is not very different from what we find in the 
sciences and in everyday human experiences: articulated experiences are already 
conditioned by a theory (though this theory may not have been developed explicitly). 
In our time it has become clear from the controversy as to whether experience 
influences theory or theory experience that to be dogmatic about experience is as 
unjustified as to be dogmatic about theory’ (Schillebeeckx 1985, 87). 
 
 Concrete experience may therefore determine a new set of real questions. In 
another context, that of the history of science, a set of real questions has been called, 
by T. Kuhn, a paradigm. Hans Küng, at one point, has made an interesting attempt to 
apply the Kuhnian analysis of paradigm changes, and the Kuhnian analysis of the 
problems associated with such changes, to the realm of theology. According to him, 
in theology as in science, while some people continue to defend an old paradigm, 
others live and work already in a different one. Küng however makes it clear that it 
would be a mistake to think that every new paradigm necessarily means progress just 
because it is new and different. For the context of theology, he marks some specific 
constraints which do not exist within the Kuhnian understanding of science: ‘A 
paradigmatic upheaval can take place in Christian theology — if it is to be and remain 
Christian — always and only on basis of the Gospel, and ultimately on account of the 
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Gospel, but never against the Gospel’ (Küng 1991, 159). Although he never seems to 
express his thoughts in terms of real and unreal questions, it seems legitimate here to 
hold that his investigations concerning paradigm shifts in theology were a move 
towards this.  
 
 As a third example, I will take a theologian from a different theological 
setting. Jon Sobrino starts his christological investigations by distinguishing what 
questions and what contexts are being presupposed by existing Christologies. He 
points out that the questions usually inherited from the European context may not be 
real for Latin Americans. A real question for people living in Latin America will not 
be related to the Heideggerian question ‘Why is there something rather than 
nothing?’, but related to the more context-dependent, and consequently less abstract, 
question: ‘Why is there suffering and oppression?’ His method highlights the fact that 
a theological question often becomes real, in the sense used above, because of the 
type of dialogue it makes us enter into: ‘Unlike European brands of theology, 
liberation theology does not see itself situated in a broader history of Latin American 
theology since the latter is of very recent vintage. So rather than engaging in dialogue 
with other theologies, philosophies or cultural movements, liberation theology has 
faced up to the basic Latin American reality of underdevelopment and oppression’ 
(Sobrino 1978, 33). This leads him to remark that, for the context of Latin America, 
some questions should receive priority-attention, or, in other words, some questions 
rather than others should considered real : ‘We are hiding from real problems and 
serving the interests of ideology if we focus on the traditional theological problems of 
transubstantiation and the hypostatic union while such issues as underdevelopment 
and its implications go unexplained’ (Sobrino 1978, 34). 
 
 These three examples of modern theologians give a preliminary idea on how 
the notion of real and unreal questions finds a place, and also can be fruitful, in 
theology. The full development of such a preliminary idea deserves a much longer 
  11 
treatment that these brief remarks here. It should moreover be recalled that valuable, 
previous work in this area has already been done (Newman 1891). The foundational 
insight is probably best captured by the Second Vatican Council expression: ‘At all 
times the Church carries the responsibility of reading the signs of the time and of 
interpreting them in the light of the Gospel’ (Gaudium et Spes § 4).  Given this basic 
insight, the third example starts taking a global significance because 
underdevelopment and poverty are now known to be the result of injustice inscribed 
within economic and social structures pervading not only some Latin American 
countries but our international community. I will venture the suggestion therefore that 
one of the ways theological questions become real in today’s world is in virtue of 
their expressing the fact that the reconciliation of people among themselves, which 
their reconciliation with God demands, must be based on justice.  
 
 Now, if this criterion for real questions in theology is accepted, one can see 
that a close link is becoming evident between real questions in theology and real 
questions in science. It was shown previously how vulnerable communities will 
probably have a much higher share of adversity before the scientific community 
becomes convinced that the environment question deserves to be considered a real 
question. There is here an element of injustice of a subtle kind. The environment 
question, and the process it takes to become real for rich communities, thus become 
an important part of one of the major real questions in theology. A link is thus 
established between a real question in one discipline and a real question in another. 
From this analysis, one may understand better how theologians carry a part of the 
responsibility for making the scientific community more and more aware of the fact 
that environment problems hit hardest not at the scientific community itself but at 
other more vulnerable communities.  
 
 One of the merits of such a linkage between theology and science through the 
idea of real questions is the following. It shows that theology is neither necessarily 
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indifferent nor necessarily against the cause of the environmentalists. There is always 
a real danger that Christianity is understood as somehow contributing to the cause of 
the environment problem. Some have argued that Christianity is inherently inimical to 
the care of the environment to such an extent that no degree of revision or 
interpretation can redeem it. For example, John Passmore mentions two points. First, 
Christianity insists on the essential difference between human beings and the rest of 
the universe; secondly, it insists as well that human beings gain a kind of salvation 
that does not depend on the natural environment (Passmore 1974, 184). This makes 
him have strong doubts whether Christianity will ever be capable of having a healthy 
attitude towards nature. Another danger related to these two points is to consider the 
non-human, created order so corrupted by original sin as to be unredeemable through 
Christ. This tendency in theology presupposes that Christ, in a sense, just managed to 
save humankind from damnation but left the rest of creation in a state of corruption.6 
If we are to reply to Passmore’s criticism and moreover develop a theology whose 
concept of salvation covers the entire creation, then one possible way is to re-examine 
the type of theological questions we start with, and to examine their links with the 
reality of the environment question in science. 
 
 By way of summary and conclusion then: recent philosophy of science has 
emphasised the importance of seeing how questions become real for the scientific 
community. The environment issue may be considered a question of this sort which is 
on the process of becoming real. This process may be analysed in terms which 
emphasise altruism or in terms which emphasise egoism. Only the latter case was 
considered. Hence it was assumed that questions become real when they concern 
issues dealing directly with survival. If, moreover, one assumes that the scientific 
community is one among many, and that this scientific community is also the one 
which is the least vulnerable to environmental problems, it follows that, for the 
                                                 
6  The origin of such theological tendencies can be traced back to the early Protestant-Catholic debates 
(Faricy 1994). 
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environment issue to become a real question, the scientific community should not 
wait until the detrimental effects are on its own doorstep. If such waiting is indulged 
in, it will be at the expense of considerable suffering undergone by other communities 
whose cry was never deciphered. This possibility of injustice links the scientific issue 
to one of the major real questions for theology today. It was argued that, since 
questions concerning global justice are real for theology, science and theology may be 
said to converge and interact at this point. 
 
 The overall conclusion is that interaction between science and theology can 
occur not only on the conceptual level. Interaction does not occur only because of the 
fact that the two disciplines share the same concepts, as they apparently do, for 
example, in the case of the concept of time or of creation. It also occurs, and maybe 
more significantly, through an understanding of real and unreal questions in both 
disciplines.7 
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